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SOCIAL PROBLEMS, Vol. 30, No. I, October 1982 
THE ORIGINS OF THE OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY 
AND HEALTH ACT OF 1970· 
PATRICK G. DONNELLY 
University of Dayton 
This paper analyzes the emergence of the Occupa tional Safety and Health Act of 
1970 and finds previous explanations of its origin inadequate . I trace the roots of this 
law to the protests of rank·and·file workers across Ih e United States a t a time when 
the support of these workers was particularly important to the two main political par· 
ties. The protes t was directed not only at those employers who operated unsafe and 
unhealthy workplaces , but a lso al union off ic ia ls who paid litt le or no attention to 
safety and health issues in negotiating new contracts. 
In 1980, 13,000 workers were killed and 2.2 mi ll ion workers suffered disabling injuries in 
workplace acc idents in the United States (National Safety Council, 1981 :25). Government 
estimates indicate tha t occupational diseases and illnesses kill ano ther 100,000 workers and a rnict 
390,000 workers each year (U .S. Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, 1972). Both 
sets of figures are conservative est imates since they rely only on cases reported by employers , who 
have an economic incentive not to report accidents and illnesses. Furthermore , the medical and 
scientific community does not know whether many commonly-used chemicals a nd o ther 
substances a re dangerous, since the onset of the disease o r illness may occur up to 30 years a fter a 
worker was exposed to the substance. T he Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970 (OSHAct) 
was designed to protect over 55 million workers in 4.1 million workplaces. It is the first com-
prehensive federal legislation in the United States to recogn ize the right of the government to in-
spect, cite, and penalize employers for infringements of the right of workers to labor under safe 
and healthy conditions. 
T he OSHAct can be traced back to 1968 when legislat ion on worke r safety and health was in-
troduced in Congress . T he legislat ive debate shows that the business communi ty was vehement ly 
opposed to the strong bill proposed by the Democrats (Bureau o f National Affairs, 1971; Page 
and O'Brien, 1973). When the Republican administration of President Nixon introduced its bi ll in 
1969, it differed significantly from the Democrat's bi ll : it gave less power to the Labor Depart -
ment, relied more on state governments, and put the final enforcement responsibilities in the 
hands of a presidentially-appointed commission. Business representatives had suggested all of 
these changes earlier, argu ing that a worker safety and health bill should not centralize power in 
anyone department or level o f government . While this analysis o f Congressiona l debate is impor-
tant for an understanding of the law-creation process, it does not consider the socia l, pol itical, 
and economic factors that led to the bill's introduction in Congress . In this paper, I first assess 
previous explanations of the origins of the OSHAct and then examine two factors which have 
been consistently overlooked; rank-and-file act ivism and the political climate of the I 96Os. 
FOUR PREVIOUS EXPLANATIONS 
The Objeclive Condilion 
Some au thors suggest that the key facto r in the birth of the OSHAct was the number of 
• An earlier version of thi s paper was presented a t the annual meeting o f the Society for the Stud y o f Social 
Problems, New York, 1980. The author thanks Bill Chambliss, Gerry T urkel, Dave Erm ann, Brenda Wixson 
Donnelly, Steve McNamee, Dan Mill er, Ron Kramer and the Social Problems rev iewers for their comments . 
Correspondence to: Department of Sociotogy, University of Dayton, Dayton, Ohio 45469. 
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workers killed and injured in the United States or the increase in these figures during the 1960s 
(Altman, 1976; Bureau of National Affairs, 1971; Gersuny, 1981). The number of workers in-
jured rose from 1,950,000 in 1960 to 2,200,000 in 1967 . Deaths from workplace accidents in-
creased from 13,800 to 14,200 during the same period (National Safety Council, 1981 :25). Much 
research was published during this period revealing previously unknown health hazards or dem-
onstrating a greater seriousness of already recognized hazards. Ashford (1976) argues that legisla-
tion was the federal government's natural response to a growing social problem. However, such 
explanations fail to explain why the government remained inactive for decades when the number 
of workers killed and injured by accidents was as high or higher than it was in 1967 . During the 
I 920s, for example, an estimated 20,000 workers were killed each year and another 2.6 million 
were disabled (Woodbury, 1927). In 1945, 16,500 workers were killed and 2 million were injured 
(National Safety Council, 1981 :25). Furthermore, while the number of workers killed and injured 
increased between 1960 and 1967, the ratio of injury and death to the total work force decreased. 
In 1960, there were 3,028 injured per 100,000 workers; by 1967 the ratio had fallen to 2,945. 
Deaths from workplace accidents decreased from 21 per 100,000 workers in 1960 to 19 in 1967 
(National Safety Council, 1981:25). While these statistics cannot minimize the seriousness of the 
problem in 1967, they do show that workplace safety was not deteriorating as others have 
implied. 
Public Opinion and Mass Media 
However serious a condition may be, little will be done to solve it unless a segment of the public 
considers it worthy of concern (Blumer, 1971; Piven and Cloward, 1971; Ross and Staines, 1972). 
Ashford (1976) suggests that the public attention given to wcrkplace disasters in the 1960s was a 
major factor leading to legislation. This implies that the OSHAct was a response to an increasing-
ly aware pUblic. However, neither public opinion polls nor media coverage suggests that unsafe 
and unhealthy working conditions were perceived as a major social problem by the public during 
the 196Os. The Gallup polls found people most concerned about the Vietnam War, crime, race-
related issues including the urban riots, the high cost of living, and poverty. In fact, at no time 
during the 1960s were workplace conditions mentioned frequently enough to warrant reporting 
by the Gallup poll (Gallup, 1972). 
Media coverage of worker safety and health issues was sparse prior to the introduction of 
legislation . I examined the New York Times Index and the Readers' Guide to Periodical 
Literature to evaluate media coverage.' The key year in assessing whether the media directed 
government attention to worker safety and health is 1967. Although the first worker safety and 
health bill was not introduced in Congress until 1968, Labor Department lawyers drafted the 
legislation in 1967. Only seven articles dealing with the issue appeared in the New York Times 
during 1967, and only six articles appeared in any of the 128 U.S. magazines indexed in the 
I. The use of such indexes to indicate the importance of social issues is widespread (Becker, 1963; Dickson, 
1968; Funkhouser, 1973; Galliher and Walker, 1977; Schoenfeld et al., 1979). I counted the number of ar-
ticles in the New York Times Index and the Readers' Guide to Periodical Literature under the subject 
headings related to worker safety and health. In the New York Times Index, the categories were: Accidents, 
Industrial; Accidents , Mining; Occupational Health ; and Labor - U.S. - Occupational Hazards and Safety. 
The main subject headings in the Readers' Guide were: Industria l Safety; Diseases, Industri al; Industrial 
Hygiene; Coal Mine and Mining- Accidents and Explosions; and Accidents, Industri al. In both indexes, 
when cross-references referred to another category, I counted on ly those art icles wh ich clearly related to 
worker safety and health hazards. The Monthly Labor Review, published by the U.S. Department of Labor, 
is indexed in the Readers' Guide but I did not count articles appearing in it because of the purpose of my 
analysis-to determine whether the social issue created government interest or vice versa. 
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Readers' Guide. In 1966, there were 12 articles in the New York Times and only one in the in-
dexed magazines. Furthermore, the magazines that published articles on worker safety and health 
in 1966 and 1967 were Science News, Business Week, the u.N. Monthly Chronicle, and 
Science-all special-interest publications. 
The few newspaper and magazine articles appearing in 1966 and 1967 might have had an im-
pact if they had represented a drastic increase in media coverage of the problem. Yet, as Table 1 
shows, there is little discernible pattern to media coverage of the problem in either the New York 
Times or the indexed magazines. The seven articles in the New York Times in 1967 represent the 
second lowest number of articles from 1950 to 1967. The six 1967 magazine articles represent a 
significant increase over the one article in 1966, but are still fewer than the number of articles in 
II of the preceding 17 years. 
It is unlikely, then, that media coverage played a major role in the creation of a law to deal with 
the problem of worker safety and health. Table I shows a sharp increase in the number of articles 
dealing with the problem only after government officials drafted legislation. Thus, government 
action played a major role in the creation of a social issue. 
An examination of the data on the attention paid to several major industrial disasters during 
the 1960s reveals a similar pattern. In 1963, two accidents in mines, one in Utah that killed 18 and 
another in Pennsylvania in which two trapped miners were dramatically rescued, triggered seven 
TABLE 1 
Media Coverage of Issues Related to Worker Safety and Health, 1950-1975 
Number of Articles In 
Readers' Guide to 
Year New York Times Index Periodical Literature 
1950 53 11 
1951 44 11 
1952 73 17 
1953 38 7 
1954 16 4 
1955 16 4 
1956 29 21 
1957 24 6 
1956 35 7 
1959 7 6 
1960 21 6 
1961 9 15 
1962 14 3 
1963 39 6 
1964 6 7 
1965 10 2 
1966 12 1 
1967 7 6 
1966 53 17 
1969 111 26 
1970 104 16 
1971 99 25 
1972 61 16 
1973 56 18 
1974 65 26 
1975 74 21 
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magazine articles within six weeks of the events. In the two years that followed these accidents, 
there were 12 magazine articles indexed under the category "Coal Mines and Mining: Accidents 
and Disasters." However, many industrial disasters in the past received considerable attention 
without leading to any large-scale attempt to eliminate the problem. On December 6, 1907, a 
mine explosion in West Virginia killed 361 workers. Only 13 days later, 239 workers were killed in 
a mine explosion in Pennsylvania. Within two years of these disasters there were 35 magazine ar-
ticles indexed under the heading "Coal Mines and Mining: Accidents and Explosions." Yet no 
major legislative action was taken. 
Environmental Interests 
Some au thors suggcst that the environmental movement of the 1960s played a major role in the 
recognit ion of the need for worker safety and health legislation (Ashford, 1976; Berman, 1978; 
Bureau of National Affairs, 1971; Gersuny, 1981). It is plausible that the recognition of generally 
deteriorating environmental conditions would lead to concern over the well-being of workers, the 
persons closest to industrial air pollution. Yet there is little evidence to support this argument. 
Rarely have the environmental movement and the worker safety and health interests overlapped. 
One federal government study of occupational health, conducted in 1965, was done for the 
Public Health Service by the National Advisory Environmental Health Committee (NAEHq. 
The study was undertaken after committee members realized that most research examined pollu-
tion in the general environment rather than the work environment (Ashford, 1976). Another link 
between the environmental and worker safety and health issues is the launching by the American 
Medical Association (AMA), in 1960, of a journal entitled The Archives oj Environmental 
Health: Preventive, Occupational, and Aerospace Medicine. However, the journal was a con-
tinuation of a previous AMA journal, The Archives oj Industrial Health. The AMA's interest in 
indust rial health preceded its interest in environmental health. 
There is some evidence that the environmental movement did not generate interest in the 
worker safety and health issue. Media interest in worker safety and health and in environmental 
concerns both accelerated in 1969, while the OSHAct was already being debated in Congress 
(Schoenfeld et 01:, 1979:48). Many of the links between the issues came after 1970. Ralph Nader's 
Health Research Group and Dr. Irving SelikofPs Society for Occupational and Environmental 
Health were both formed afterwards. Local groups such as PhilaPOSH, the Philadelphia Project 
on Occupational Safety and Health, began working with environmental groups on projects of 
mutual interest in the late 1970s. 
The environmentalists were often at odds with workers prior to the OSHAct because of the dif-
ferent concerns of the two groups (Gunningham, 1974; Stellman and Daum, 1973). The en-
vironmentalists often pressed for the elimination of pollution even when it would mean a loss of 
jobs. There is little evidence that environmental interests played an active role in generating con-
cern about the safety of the workplace. 
Labor Union Interest 
During the 1960s, a period of relative prosperity, unions did not have to struggle for higher 
wages, fringe benefits, and pensions, since industry was willing to share the fruits. But there is no 
evidence to support the claim that this freed unions to struggle for safer working conditions, as 
the Bureau of National Affairs (1971) argues. Unions traditionally have given little attention to 
safety and health (Cummins, 1932), and the 1960s were no exception. One indicator of organized 
labor's willingness to press for improved safety and health conditions is the extent of work stop-
pages over the issue. Yet, relatively few work stoppages occur over safety and health issues. Since 
1961, the classification system used by the Bureau of Labor Statistics on the cause of strikes in-
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eludes a category labeled "Safety Measures, Dangerous Equipment, Etc." At no time during the 
1960s were more than 1.6 percent of all strikes in the United States over safety hazards (U .S. 
Department of Labor, 1961-70). 
In May, 1966, President Johnson challenged unions to transcend the "bread and butter issues 
in order to join with us in the effort to improve the total environment" (Public Papers of the 
Presidents, 1966:237). He referred to new health hazards created by industry since the Second 
World War. 
Neither George Meany, president of the AFL-CI0, nor Walter Reuther, head of the UA W, displayed any 
real interest in the issue, and their lack of enthusiasm undercut any desire on the part of the White House 
to press forward with a new program (Page and O'Brien, 1973:138). 
It might be argued that organized labor settles safety and health problems through collective 
bargaining. Yet, a number of government surveys of collective bargaining agreements during the 
1950s and 1960s demonstrate that this is not the case. A national survey of 1,594 agreements in ef-
fect in 1954-55 shows that only 356 (22 percent) contained clauses providing for committees con-
cerned with plant safety, sanitation, and employee health. Among these agreements were 75 
which did not specify that employers and unions were to participate jointly on the committees 
(U.S. Department of Labor, 1956). Bureau of Labor Statistics data on collect ive bargaining 
agreements a decade later, in 1963-64, again demonstrate the lack of concern on the part of 
organized labor. Only 21 of 450 major agreements (5 percent) sampled contained any provision 
for union-management cooperation in safety and health issues. Two clauses that the U.S. Depart-
ment of Labor (1966:44) described as typical were: (a) The union agrees with the objective of 
achieving the highest level of employee performance and efficiency with safety, good health, and 
sustained effort; and (b) Consistent with the principle of a fair day's work for a fair day's pay and 
consistent with the employees' welfare in regard to safety, health, and sustained effort, the union 
agrees to cooperate with management in its efforts to increase employee effectiveness and pro-
ductivity. Such clauses do not demonstrate organized labor's deep concern for safety and health 
since they balance workers' health and safety against productivity and profit. 
The platforms of the American Federation of Labor-Congress of Industrial Organizations 
(AFL-CIO) that were presented to the Democratic and Republican national conventions in 1964 
and 1968 also show the low priority given to safety and health conditions. In 1964, the AFL-CiO 
platform was 24 pages long and covered the foHowing topics in order of discussion: economic 
issues and jobs, the Civil Rights Act of 1964, foreign policy and defense, social and public needs, 
labor and management (relations), social security and health, and government administration. 
The only mention of worker safety and health came on page 22, when 11 sentences were devoted 
to asking the federal government to help make state safe ty codes uniform (American Federation 
of Labor-Congress of Industrial Organizations, 1964). In 1968, the AFL-CIO platform ex-
panded to 34 pages and added another issue, the urban crisis, to its program. This time, 13 sen-
tences were devoted to worker safety and health on page 30. The AFL-CIO called for "federal 
leadership and support" to get prompt act ion from politicians "toward achieving a safe, healthy 
work environment for every American worker" (American Federation of Labor- Congress of in-
dustrial Organizations, 1968), yet this proposal was submitted a/ler the first version of the 
OSHAct had been introduced in Congress. 
Suggestions that the extent of the condition, public opinion or media interest, the environmental 
movement's convergence with labor interests, or the push of organized labor motivated introduc-
tion of legislation clearly run contrary to fact. There is, however, much evidence to suggest that 
rank-and-file act ivism was an important factor leading to the OSHAct. Moreover, a particular set 
of political circumstances made it possible for the rank-and-file workers to exert more power than 
was usually available to them. 
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RANK·AND·FILE ACTIVISM 
Throughout the 1960s, rank-and-file workers in many of the major labor unions expressed 
their dissatisfaction with working conditions in general and with safety and health conditions in 
particular. They also protested against the way their union officials were dealing with the prob-
lem . This dissatisfaction was seldom reported in the headlines of newspapers and magazines but 
was a recurrent sub-theme in many articles appearing in publications such as the New York 
Times, the Wall Street Journal, and Business Week. I surveyed articles indexed in the New York 
Times Index and the Readers' Guide dealing with labor unrest and worker dissatisfaction from 
1960 to 1967.' These sources are used to describe the actions of rank-and-file workers in several 
major unions. Beginning in the mid-1960s, wage issues became less important as a source of 
worker unrest. Grievance procedure, union local autonomy, working conditions, speed-ups, and 
safety and health conditions were cited with increasing regularity as sources of conflict between 
the rank and file and their union officials and management. 
The members of the United Auto Workers (UA W) were among the first groups to express their 
dissatisfaction with working conditions. Between 1953 and 1955, thousands of UAW members 
across the United States and in all major auto companies participated in wildcat strikes to protest 
industry-imposed and union-sanctioned production speed-ups (Aronowitz, 1973). This rank-and-
file concern continued throughout the 1950s and 1960s. In July, 1966,9,000 workers walked off 
their jobs at three Ford plants in Cleveland where 200 unsettled grievances - most of them involv-
ing inadequate safety and health standards- had accumulated (Business Week, I 966a). In Oc-
tober, 1966, 4,200 UA W workers at the Twinsburg, Ohio, Chrysler plant went on strike over 
unsettled grievances involving working conditions, including the dangers involved with fork-lift 
trucks at the plant (Business Week, 1966b). The elimination of fumes at a Ford foundry plant in 
Cleveland was a major demand by local leaders when the 1967 UA W contract was negotiated 
(Shafer, 1967). Health and safety conditions caused frequent conflicts between management and 
workers in the Ford plant in Livonia, Michigan. In 1967, the president of Local 182 in Livonia 
complained that expenditures for health and safety conditions were usually the first to be cut 
since they were not directly related to manufacturing the product (Business Week, 1967). 
In February, 1967, a UAW local at a General Motors plant in Mansfield, Ohio, called a wildcat 
st rike when two workers were fired for refusing to prepare materials and equipment for shipment 
to another plant. Certain work operations were being shifted to the Pontiac, Michigan, plant as a 
result of the Mansfield workers' complaints that safety conditions on that operation were poor. 
In all, 133,000 workers from 20 different shops walked off the job. Walter Reuther, the president 
of the UA W, called the strike illegal and sent representatives to Mansfield to convince local 
leaders to call it off. Reuther's officials told the local leaders that their strike was ill-timed because 
the national UA W organization was planning to give priority to higher salaries and profit-sharing 
in upcoming contract negotiations (Weir, 1967). This fact strongly undermines claims that the 
unions gave more attention to safety and health during the relatively prosperous sixties. 
The United Mine Workers (UMW), usually one of the more militant unions, was also involved 
in a major dispute over safety conditions. In the summer of 1965, five UMW members in Mounds-
ville, West Virginia, were fired for refusing to work under conditions that they considered unsafe. 
Employers had ordered the crew to work when the full mine operations were shut down. Within 
days, more than 17,000 miners in West Virginia, Ohio, and Pennsylvania went on a wildcat strike 
(U .S . Department of Labor, 1966). The members realized that their concern for worker safety 
and health issues could only be implemented if they had greater participation in contract negotia-
2. Once a date for a particular incident o r issue dealing with sa fety and health conditions was found, I used 
other sources to supplement the sources found in these two indexes. 
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tions. They agreed to return to work only after the UMW International promised them a greater 
voice in the next contract negotiations (Weir, 1967). 
In June, 1965, 12,000 Teamsters in the Philadelphia area walked off their jobs when four 
employees of one company were fired for refusing to work under conditions they considered 
dangerous. The workers claimed that obstructions in their path made unloading their truck a 
dangerous assignment. Jimmy Hoffa, then president of the Teamsters, called the strike illegal 
and told the workers to go back to their jobs. They refused. The employers obtained a court in-
junction ordering the truckers back to work, but the strikers ignored it. The lead paragraph in a 
New York Times story about the strike is reminiscent of scenes much more common in earlier 
periods of union-management relations: 
Armed with bats and iron pipes, gangs of striking truck drivers roamed the streets of Philadelphia today 
attempting to halt the movement of food and freight (Bigart, 1965a: 16) . 
Mayor James Tate ordered the Philadelphia police to "break the siege by Teamsters who have 
paralyzed the distribution of fruit and vegetables in the city" (Bigart, 1965b:49). A judge in the 
Common Pleas Court suggested that the National Guard be called in if the police could not main-
tain law and order in a situation which he characterized as "a bit of anarchy" (Bigart, 1965c:36). 
Fines of $35,000 a day against the local and $1,500 a day against each union official finally con-
vinced the workers to go back to their jobs after a week (New York Times, 1965b). Before the 
strike ended, officials of the city's four largest food chains announced that they were within a day 
of being forced to close all their stores because of food shortages. Many gas stations closed 
because deliveries were not made. One company laid off 1,200 of its 1,400 employees while 
another furloughed all of its 1,250 workers (New York Times, 1965a). 
While the issue of safety and health did not cause as severe disruptions in the United 
Steelworkers of America union, it was a constant underlying factor in the complaints of many 
rank-and-file workers and local officials throughout the 1960s. The key issue in the Steelworkers' 
1964 contract negotiations was not wages but working conditions. Weeks before the negotiating 
sessions began, Local lOll in Youngstown, Ohio, placed a resolution before the union's district 
council demanding a stronger emphasis on plant safety. It also urged that locals be given the right 
to strike over local issues such as safety and health (Business Week, 1964). Members of a local 
near Pittsburgh complained that safety and health precautions were frequently neglected by 
management and appealed to the national leadership to give greater attention to the issue (Stet-
son, 1964). 
Other unions also experienced rank-and-file discontent with officials' lack of concern over 
working conditions. During the I 96Os, members of the International Longshoremen's Associa-
tion, the International Longshoremen's and Warehousemen's Union, the International Associa-
tion of Machinists Union, and the International Union of Electrical Workers sought to bring 
about better working conditions by striking and rejecting contracts negotiated by their officials. 
Some, but not all, of these actions centered on safety and health conditions. 
Clearly, safety and health concerns were on the minds of workers. More clearly, many rank-
and-file workers were protesting against unsafe and unhealthy workplace conditions. At the same 
time, the political climate of the 1960s increased the likelihood that such protests would not fall 
on deaf ears. 
POLITICAL CLIMATE 
In the summer of 1%7, Labor Department lawyers began drafting an occupational safety and 
health bill . The bill was completed by late fall and included in a package of legislation sent to the 
White House by the Labor Department at the end of 1967. White House officials then met with 
Labor Depar'tment officials and representatives of several other agencies and departments to 
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prepare the final version (Page and O'Brien, 1973). The bill was introduced in Congress in early 
1968, an election year, at a time when the Johnson administration was coming under widespread 
criticism for its handling of the Vietnam War. From late 1966 on, both the Harris and Gallup 
polls indicated that the leading Republican slate, whether led by George Romney, Nelson Rocke-
feller, Ronald Reagan, or Richard Nixon, would defeat a Johnson-led ticket. 
Organized labor's response to Johnson's candidacy was predictable. In January, 1967, George 
Meany, president of the AFL-CIO, personally endorsed Johnson for president. The UA W's 
Reuther, while voicing some concern over Johnson's handling of the war, followed suit eight 
months later. An AFL-CIO poll of union members taken in January, 1967, showed Johnson 
with a strong lead over any Republican challenger. Yet, as 1967 wore on, the support of the rank 
and file became both more crucial and more problematic. Governor George Wallace's potential 
candidacy further complicated the picture. Shannon (1967), a New York Times political analyst, 
wrote in the summer of 1967 that Wallace's entry would severely undermine Johnson's prospects 
for re-election. He pointed out that Johnson would need the strong united support of the tradi-
tional democratic allies, the trade unions, and liberal independents, but predicted that such sup-
port would not be forthcoming. It was clear that the Democratic party would not be unified and 
that most liberals and much of the academic community would find it difficult to support 
Johnson. This meant that labor's support was even more crucial for Johnson. 
Concern over the loss of rank-and-file support was expressed most clearly in August, 1967, by 
John Bailey, then head of the Democratic National Committee. He noted that the party was in 
danger of losing its traditional support from the rank and file and suggested that prosperity "has 
virtually eliminated for the present and perhaps forever, many of the ties of traditional political 
leadership." Workers were no longer going along with the candidates endorsed by union officials 
(New York Times, 1967:30). 
On January 23, 1968, Johnson announced to Congress that the protection of 75 million U.S. 
workers must become a national goa\. The following day, the Occupational Safety and Health 
Act of 1968 was introduced in Congress. The swiftness with which the bill was drafted and in-
troduced surprised Secretary Willard Wirtz, who testified that the bill "developed quickly," too 
quickly to allow adequate consultation with those responsible for safety and health program~ at 
the state level (U.S. Congress: House, 1968:34). Wirtz later admitted that he did not even know 
Johnson "had decided to make occupational safety and health a principal element in his program 
this year" until several days before the president's address to Congress (Page and O'Brien, 
1973:140). The legislation was drafted and introduced at a time when the political support of 
rank-and-file workers was desperately needed by the incumbent president. During Congressional 
hearings on the bill in 1968, the Southern States Industrial Council issued a statement calling it 
"an attempt to create in the public mind a crisis where none exists, in order to capitalize politically 
on the natural concern of all citizens" for worker safety and health. It referred to the administra-
tion's "obvious election year effort by [sic) develop an image as guardian and saviour of the pro-
duction worker" (U.S. Congress: House, 1968:960). In the Senate, the bill was never reported out 
of the Committee on Labor and Public Welfare in 1968, whi le the House Committee on Educa-
tion and Labor did adopt an amended version. However, the bill never reached the House floor. 
The priority usually given to administration bills disappeared when Johnson decided not to seek 
his party's nomination (Page and O'Brien, 1973). 
The key issue of the 1968 presidential election campaign was the Vietnam War. Campaigning 
for "peace with honor," Nixon won despite Hubert Humphrey's 14 percent edge among union 
workers (Harris, 1973). Nixon had sought the support of the "silent majority," the "forgotten 
Americans, the non-shouters, the non-demonstrators," and continued to turn to them for sup-
port after the election. The "New American Majority" that Nixon sought to create had for its 
backbone the working and middle class. The majority was "middle America" with its emphasis on 
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tradit ional values. Geographically, it was the South and the ethnic and working-class prec incts of 
the North and Midwest tha t Nixon sought to use as a support base (Buchanan, 1973) . The Nixon 
administration soon discovered that one segment of the rank and file actually supported his ef-
forts to win the war. T his point was driven home during May, 1970, fo llowing the U.S. invas ion 
of Cambodia. As anti-war demonstrations grew in size and frequency, construction workers in 
New York C ity took to the streets in support of the presiden t. One particu lar ma rch, organized 
by the building trades union, erupted in violence when it was rumored that anti-war protestors 
had burned a U.S . flag . The workers attacked the demonstrators, mostl y st udents, with fi sts, 
pipes, and wrenches . Within weeks, the leaders of the construction workers' march were received 
by Nixon in the White House a nd thanked for their support (Harris, 1973). 
At the same time, Nixon continued to court the Teamsters. In the 1968 election , Nixon received 
almost $ 1 millio n in campaign contributions from Las Vegas supporters who had secured la rge 
loans from the Teamsters through their imprisoned leader , Jimmy Hoffa . Soon afterward , "the 
wheels began to grind in the Just ice Department a nd White House for a Hoffa pardon" (Velie, 
1977:41) . Two hundred a nd fifty thousand Teamsters signed a petition urging Ni xon to free Hof-
fa and suggesting that their political support was conditio nal upon Hoffa's release . Hoffa was 
pardoned in December, 1971 (Velie, 1977) . While befriending both the new leadership and the 
rank-and-file Teamsters, Nixon also responded to an issue troubling ma ny Teamsters. The 
Teamsters' strike in Philadelphia was one indication of thi s concern . To ignore the safety a nd 
health issue would not be politically expedient, particularly afte r the Democrats reintroduced 
their bill in 1969. So the Republicans countered several months la ter with their own, substa ntia ll y 
weaker, bill . As long as the Republican administratio n played a n active ro le a nd succeeded in 
passing a worker safety and health bill, it could and did a rgue tha t it was pro tect ing the safety and 
health of the rank a nd file . The symbolic impact of the legisla tio n would ass ure the Republ icans a 
cla im to the rank-and-file vote in the 1972 election.) 
The OSHAct of 1970 was a compromise . W hile labor did not get a ll it wanted, the law does 
give the rank and file a mechanism to improve the safety and health conditio ns in workplaces. J 
Nor d id business get what it originally wanted-no law at a ll . However, it did succeed in 
drastically diluting the original proposed legisla tion. 
Struggles over the legal process do not end with the passage of legislation . Since 1970, the Oc-
cupational Safe ty and Health Administration has been attacked from many front s: by manage-
ment for being overly concerned with trivial standa rds; by labor for being too weak, lenient, a nd 
ineffective; and by other branches of government for proposing sta ndards th a t would fu el infla-
tion . The OSHAct awakened union interest in the issue. More managemen t-unio n safety commit-
tees have been fo rmed and more collecti ve bargaining agreements include sa fety a nd health provi-
sions than ever before. In 1963-64, only five percent of 450 major agreements contained provi-
sions for management-union cooperation . [n 1974- 75,44 percent of 1,724 ag reements contained 
such provisions (U .S . Department of Labor, 1976). [n 1954-55, 22 percent of the agreemen ts 
3. In the 1972 election, the AFL-CIO's Meany fought George McGovern 's nominat ion and threa tened to put 
on probation any local affiliate that endorsed him. Meany showed hi s personal preference for Nixo n (Harr is, 
1973). In the course of the 1972 campaign, Nixon was known to have received $ 165.000 from labor . mos tl y 
from the Seafarers and the Teamsters. Hoffa suspected that the Teamsters contributed much more than th ey 
reported (Alexander , 1976). Fifty-six percent of union members voted for Nixon (Harris. 1973). 
4. The OSHAct created the Occupational Safety and Health Administration in the Department of Labor . 
The Labor Department is responsible for setting standards for industry and for enforc ing those standards 
t~rough inspections and penalties, where appropriate. The Occupa tional Safety and Health Review Commis-
SIon was establi shed as an independent, quasi-judicia l review board appointed by the preside nt. It rules on a ll 
enforcement actions of the Occupational Safety and Health Admin ist ration. Workers have the righl to ca ll in 
tnspectors when they fee l haza rdous conditions exist. Individual states may rega in authoril Y to opera le their 
Own programs if they can demonstrate that they will be at least as effect ive as the federal program. 
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contained clauses providing for joint committees, compared with 27 percent in 1974- 75 (U .S. 
Department of Labor, 1976). Union members who feel their officials have not done enough in 
this area have filed suits against their unions (Drapkin, 1981), and numerous regional committees 
on worker safety and health have been organized (Berman, 1981). In addition, the Supreme 
Court of the United States provided a basis for workers to refuse unsafe and unhealthy work in 
the Whirlpool v. Marshall (1980) decision . 
Businessmen have attempted to weaken the Occupational Safety and Health Administration by 
challenging its standards, causing delays in their enactment, and using the courts and Congress to 
limit its powers (Deutsch, 1981). Business has won its share of these battles, including the right of 
plant managers to refuse entrance to inspectors who do not have court-issued warrants (Marshall 
v. Barlow, 1978), and the requirement that the Occupational Safety and Health Administration 
must demonstrate scientifically that reductions in exposure limits be "reasonably necessary" to 
provide safe and healthy employment conditions (Industrial Union Department, AFL- CIO v. 
American Petroleum Institute, 1980). 
SUMMARY 
Previous explanations of the OSHAct are based on public statements made during Congres-
sional hearings in which union officials and environmental groups painted a dismal picture of 
rapidly deteriorating safety and health conditions. However, the OSHAct was not spawned by a 
growing safety problem, by heightened public awareness of the problem, by a convergence of the 
environmental movement with worker health and safety interests, or by the concerted efforts of 
organized labor. Rather, the roots of the law can be traced to the rebellion of rank-and-file 
workers across the United States at a time when the political support of these workers was par-
ticularly important. Wildcat strikes, walkouts, rejected contracts, and violent confrontations ex-
pressed rank-and-file dissatisfaction with existing safety and health conditions. The low ratings 
of an incumbent president in a pre-election year made united rank-and-file support an essential 
ingredient for political success. These two factors together made possible the emergence of a 
worker safety and health law. 
DISCUSSION 
Since the origins of this law lie in the overt class struggle initiated by the rank and file, we must 
look more closely at the nature of that conflict. The conflict was directed at those employers who 
operated unsafe and unhealthy workplaces. The rank and file sought to change workplace condi-
tions which, in the United States, are usually considered the sole domain of employers. In refus-
ing to do hazardous work, in walking off unsafe work sites, and in stopping the flow of business 
traffic, the workers disrupted employers' operations. In some cases, entire businesses were forced 
to shut down. The rank and file employed its most potent weapon, its labor, in an attempt to 
force concessions relating to safety and health conditions . 
However, the protests were not directed solely at those businesses who maintained unsafe and 
unhealthy workplaces . They were also directed at the union hierarchy, who consistently expressed 
little or no concern oyer hazardous working conditions. These protests indicated that the rank 
and file wanted their union officials to take a more active role in determining safety and health 
conditions. Rejected contracts and refusals to obey union officials' back-to-work orders cast 
doubt on the legitimacy of the union hierarchy. In unions with more democratic electoral 
systems, these protests threatened re-election for officials, whose problems were compounded 
when management realized that the officials could no longer guarantee acceptance of negotiated 
contracts. More generally, these protests showed that the union officials had lost touch with their 
constituency and that they no longer represented the workers' interests. 
The rank-and-file struggles of the 1950s and 1960s that culminated in the OSHAct were an at-
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tempt by workers to protect their own health and safety . Deutsch (1981) suggests that such strug-
gles cannot be separated from the broader issues of worker control and democracy in the work-
place. In this case, the workers sought to force both employers to improve conditions and their 
union officials to assert more power in shaping these conditions . When the officials did not, the 
rank and file rejected negotiated contracts. Simultaneously, the rank and file sought to exert 
more influence in union decision-making by demanding more input into contract negotiations. In 
general, workers were demanding a greater voice in the operations of the workplace. 
On a broader level, the law channeis future conflict into bureaucratic procedures. Byawaken-
ing union interest in safety and health, the OSHAct gives more union workers institutionalized 
conflict-resolution mechanisms in their collective bargaining agreements. They can work to 
eliminate hazards through their plant safety and health committees or through the established 
grievance procedures in their contracts. These mechanisms defuse overt conflict. In addit ion, the 
Occupational Safety and Health Administration and the Occupational Safety and Health Review 
Commission also act as institutionalized mechanisms to deal with issues relating to safety and 
health on the job. The rank and file may work through these agencies to resolve disputes over 
hazards. Instead of walking off the job when other attempts to eliminate workplace hazards fai l, 
workers now have the right, which they are expected to exercise, to call in Occupational Safety 
and Health inspectors. Instead of open confrontations, legal mechanisms are available to im-
prove working conditions. The nature of the conflict is changed. Problems of unsafe and 
unhealthy workplaces have become bureaucratic, legal issues rather than political ones. The con-
flict takes place in judicial or quasi-judicial settings rather than in the workplaces and the streets. 
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